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it HIS IS A WELCOME OPPORTUNITY to dis-
cuss my view of the state of our economy with friends
of long standing, the bankers of Mississippi. As busi-
ness leaders in Mississippi and in your local communi-
ties, it is, of course, always important that you keep
in touch with economic stabilization efforts to pro-
mote a high level of employment and relatively stable
prices. At this particular time, I want also to discuss
with you some pitfalls which could threaten the suc-
cess of those efforts and defeat their objectives.
By way of background, I will examine two topics,
tracing first the development of our inflation since
1965, and next, some reasons for the extremely slow
response of inflation to monetary and fiscal restraint
of the past two years. This background is essential to
my principal point which is this — a possible threat to
the success of current stabilization actions. This threat
comes from some frequently expressed desires to
achieve several good but incompatible objectives by
year’s end — namely, a markedly lower rate of infla-
tion, little further rise in unemployment, and a sharp
reduction in market interest rates. I say actions to
accomplish these short-run objectives constitute a
threat because attaining any one of them would re-
quire extreme monetary actions, leading to later con-
ditions quite contrary to desired policy objectives.
Moreover, these near-termn objectives cannot be
achieved simultaneously.
In developing the background topics and outlining
the possible impediments to achieving current policy
objectives, my remarks will draw heavily on recent
research at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
For the past two years our economists have been at-
tempting to quantify the response of total spending,
real output, the price level, the unemployment rate,
and market interest rates to monetary and fiscal ac-
tions. Monetary actions in this research are measured
by changes in the nation’s money stock — that is, de-
mand deposits and currency held by the nonbarak
public. Fiscal actions refer to changes in spending and
taxing provisions of the Federal Government budget.
One important conclusion suggested by these stud-
ies is that actions of the Federal Reserve which change
the rate of monetary expansion exert a relatively
quick and pervasive influence on total spending, and
changes in Federal Government expenditures rela-
tively less, unless accompanied by accommodating
changes in the money stock. Changes in Federal tax-
ing provisions are found to have an insignificant influ-
ence on total spending.
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I turn now to my first background topic — an ex-
amination of our inflation since 1985. After six years
of relative price stability from 1958 to 1984, we have
since experienced accelerating inflation. The general
price level rose at a three per cent annual rate from
late 1965 to mid-1967, then at a four per cent rate to
the end of 1968, and finally, during the past five
quarters, at a five per cent rate. The inflation rate
shows few signs of abating up to now.
This five-year record of accelerating inflation re-
sulted from the pressure of total spending on the
abffity of our economy to produce goods and services,
particularly since early 1966. From the first quarter
of 1966 to mid-1968, total spending rose at a 7.5 per
cent annual rate, while output of goods and services
grew at about a four per cent rate, or approximately
the rate of growth of the economy’s productive poten-
tial. At full employment of our resources, expansion
of real output depends on growth in the labor force,
capital plant, and technology. In recent years these
factors have fostered growth of production potential
at about a four per cent annual rate.
By 1968 and 1969, inflation had developed a very
strong momentum which has complicated greatly the
problem of reducing the rate of increase of prices.
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This momentum is the result of households, busi-
nesses, and labor unions attempting to protect their
economic positions by building anticipated price in-
creases into contracts for goods, services, and loans.
In this manner, the “demand pull” inflation of i965
to 1968 was subsequently changed into “cost push”
inflation. I want to point out, however, that excessive
total spending was the basic cause of our present
inflation problem, and that the so-called cost push in-
flation is also a result of earlier excessive total demand.
Where did the excessive increase in total spending
come from? Mainly it wasa result of overly expansive
monetary actions. The money stock increased from
April1965 to April 1966 at a six per cent annual rate,
at that time the fastest rate since the inflationary
period of the Korean War. Following 1966 when the
money stock remained unchanged for eight months,
money grew at a seven per cent rate during 1967 and
1968, the most rapid rate since World War II.
That period when the money stock remained
unchanged during the last eight months of 1966 set
the stage for curbing inflation. This could have led to
a balanced rate of spending if it had not been fol-
lo~vedby resumption of expansion in money at a very
rapid rate in 1967 and 1968. Our studies indicate that
if expansion in money had been maintained at a
moderate four per cent rate instead of the seven per
cent rate actually recorded in 1967 and 1968, the rate
of inflation since late 1966 most likely would not
have surpassed 3.5 per cent, instead of reaching five
per cent as it did last year. Moreover, if the four per
cent growth in money had been maintained up to
the present, the rate of inflation would be receding,
and if that moderate rate of monetary expansion
were to be continued through 1972, price increases
would be down to about a 1.5 per cent rate by the
end of that year.
Excessive total spending has not only been the
cause of price inflation but also of the great increase
of market interest rates during the past four years.
Our research indicates that market interest rates are
highly responsive to anticipated price changes. Past
increases in the price level, such as those during the
last five years, cause participants in the money and
capital markets to expect a continued high rate of
inflation. An inflationary premium is thus built into
market interest rates. We attribute almost all of the
sharp rise in market interest rates since 1966 to an
accelerating inflation fostered by excessive monetary
expansion.
As was the case with the general price level, the
monetary restraint of 1966 set the stage for lower
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interest rates Our studic’, indic mte that i moderate
four per cent growth in money from the end of 1966
to the end of 1969 would have produced a peak in
short-term interest rates, as measured by the rate on
four- to six-month commercial paper, of around 5.5 per
cent, and these interest rates would have been about
4.5 per cent this spring, instead of the present eight
per cent or more. Further continuation of this mod-
erate growth in money would have produced short-
term interest rates heading to belosv four per cent by
late 1972. Long-term interest rates \vould have moved
in a similar manner. With a four per cent growth in
money, seasoned corporate Aaa bond rates would have
probably peaked at about 6.25 per cent, would likely
have been about 6 per cent this spring compared
with the actual level of almost 8 per cent, and would
be moving to about 5 per cent in late 1972,
It must be evident to everyone that our failure to
take advantage, during 1967-1968, of the eight months
of restraint in 1966 was a golden opportunity lost.
Had the period of restraint been followed by a mod-
erate, instead of rapid monetary expansion, the many
economic dislocations caused by the continuation of
high and accelerating rates of inflation after 1966
could have been prevented. Commercial banks and
savings institutions could h<uc done very well with
short-term market interest rates not in excess of 5.5
per cent, as these institutions would not have under-
gone the problems caused by the disintermediation of
the last three years.
Furthennore, the housing industry would have been
in much better condition throughout this period. Labor
contract negotiations today would have been less
acrimonious and disruptive. And, of course, the whole
of society would have benefited by a lesser rate of
inflation.
A logical question to be asked is, “Why was this
opportunity to control inflation lost?” The published
record and statements of prominent economists in-
dicate several reasons. First, there was the mistaken
belief at the time that easing actions of monetary
authorities could prevent increases in market interest
rates in the short run or, as some argued, actually
lo\ver them permanently. Such actions were deemed
desirable in order to shelter savings institutions and
the housing industry from market forces set in motion
by the excessive total spending. Second, many argued
that monetary actions, as indicated by changes in the
money stock, have little influence on total spending.
As’aconsequencc~,those holding this view were little
disturbed by the exceedingly rapid growth in the
money stock. Third, in contrast with the previous
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view, many believed that rapid growth in money
was desirable in early 1967 to avoid an anticipated
recession. Finally, the national debt was increasing,
and it was thought desirable by many that the Fed-
eral Reserve “even keel” the money markets at times
of Treasury financings.
All of these reasons have proven to have been
spurious. The resumption of rapid monetary growth
in 1967 and 1968 gave us higher interest rates, not
lo\ver; less funds for housing, not more; greater
strains in the financial markets, not less; and more
difficulty with managing the Federal debt, not less.
5~~~’~m’ ~
With inflation mounting, restraining actions have
been adopted since mid-1968, but the response of
inflation has been agonizingly slow, People naturally
ask why. The answer is fairly simple — as a result of
avoiding monetary actions to curb inflation until 1969,
an inflationary momentum was allowed to develop.
As a result, the general price level has continued to
rise rapidly up to the present time, and market in-
terest rates remain near their extremely high levels
of late 1969. This is the legacy of the excessive total
spending from 1965 to 1968, which requires more
restraint and patience to overcome now that inflation
is moving under its own momentum.
As a step toward restraint, monetary expansion was
reduced to a four per cent rate during the first half
of 1969. Further restraint was applied in the second
half of 1969 when there was no growth in money.
The impact of such monetary actions has fallen pri-
marily on total spending and real output of goods
and services and not, as yet, to any appreciable ex-
tent, on the price level,
Some have begun to question whether monetary
restraint will result in slower growth in the price level
in a reasonable period of time. But our research in-
dicates that a marked move to monetary restraint,
such as we had in 1969, generally slows total spend-
ing with only a two- to three-quarter lag, and this
was the case in 1969. Such a change in the rate of
growth of total spending is accompanied by a simul-
taneous decrease in the rate of growth of output. And
so it was in the last year. It is not until a further
two or three quarters that prices respond appreciably
to the slower growth in spending. So we should not
have expected price restraint in 1969. The course of
the price level depends not only on total spending
but also on anticipated price movements. The greater
the anticipated rise in prices, the longer delayed is
the response of the price level to monetary restraint.
This is what we mean by the problem of inflationary
momentum.
So here we are again in 1970, with the stage set
for reducing the rate of price increase, just as was
the situation at the beginning of 1967. But 1970 is
not exacily like 1966: inflation has built up a longer
and stronger momentum since then. Consequently, it
is more difficult to curb inflation this time; and the
public, as well as economic policy makers, must be
patient in \vaiting for the results of monetaiy restraint
to appear.
Many have become concerned that the extreme
monetary restraint of 1969 may result in excessive
retardation of economic growth and have recom-
mended a resumption of monetary expansion. I, too,
share these concerns, and I favor a moderate rise in
the money stock. We should avoid, however, a repeat
of the 1967-1968 experience when concern over a
possible recession was one of the major bases for ex-
cessively stimulative monetary actions. This effort will
take time — longer than it would have taken if pur-
sued to completion following 1966. Now, as many as
three more years will probably be required for the
rate of price advance to fall below two per cent,
assuming a moderate rate of growth in the money
stock.
While moderate growth in money will reduce price
increases to a tolerable rate by late 1,972, this achieve-
ment will not he withommt some transitional costs. Dur-
ing the next three years, growth of real output would
remain below the economy’s productive potential,
and, as a result, the unemployment rate would con-
tinue to increase, If our measurements of the re-
sponse of prices and unemployment to stabilization
actions are reasonably correct, and I believe they are,
the excesses of 1965 to 1968 cannot be corrected with-
out temporary costs in terms of lost output and
employment opportunities.
I turn now to my final subject — some possible
threats to a successful fight against inflation. Many
nny not be satisfied with the price level, output,
unemployment, and interest rate movements between
now and late i972 that I have just indicated are
likely to follow from a moderate rate of monetary
expansion. Many recommend that present stabiliza-
tion actions be altered so that in 1970 the rate of
inflation be reduced to below four per cent. Others
argue that the unemployment rate should not he al-
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lowed to reach five per cent this year. Some propose
that market interest rates be reduced markedly in the
near term. It is argued that once these immediate
objectives have been achieved, moderate monetary
growth can safely be resumed in 1971 and 1972.
But these desired accomplishments are not mutu-
ally compatible. To achieve any one of them this year,
we are probably not wilhng to consciously pay the
costs in terms of the other two, In addition, achieving
any one of these short-run objectives may set in mo-
tion forces which would lead to unacceptable con-
sequences at the end of two or three years.
I have already indicated that a policy of moderate
four per cent rate of monetary expansion during the
next three years \vill most likely produce reasonably
stable prices by late 1972, along with lower interest
rates. Let us now examine the implications for late
1972 of alternative monetary policies over the balance
of this year which would be designed to achieve the
three short-run objectives I have just outlined. In
each case, I will assume, after 1970, a four per cent
rate of growth in money. Given the existing inflation-
ary momentum, extreme monetary actions in terms of
growth in money would be required to achieve any
one of the three objectives by the end of this year.
Let us first examine the proposal that the rate of
inflation be reduced below four per cent by the end
of this year. Many have actually forecast a rate of
price increase in the 3.5 to 4 per cent range. In
order to accomplish this objective — a rate of inflation
below four per cent — the money stock would have to
be decreased at about a four per cent rate from the
first to the fourth quarter. The price situation would
be very good in 1972, when the price level would be
rising very slowly. Such an action would result now,
however, in an extremely severe recession. Output
would probably decrease sharply during the next five
quarters, and the unemployment rate would be mark-
edly higher in 1972 than now, In my opinion, the
employment and output costs of attaining rapid price
level restraint in 1970 would be far too high for it
to be given serious consideration,
The next short-run proposal to be examined is the
one calling for actions to avoid further recession and
to hold the unemployment rate below five per cent
during the remainder of this year. This proposal is
based on the same kinds of fears of a recession as, in
early 1967, led to a high rate of growth in the money
stock. Accomplishment of this objective, according to
our studies, would require a ten per cent rate of
monetary expansion during the last three quarters of
this year.
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Such a course of monetary action \vould provide
little reduction in the rate of price advance this year
and a rate of inflation still in excess of three per cent
in late 1972. It could be said that this would be very
slow progress in curbing inflation, and I would agree.
This course of monetary expansion would result in
only a temporary spurt of growth in real output. By
1972, as a result of the shift back to a moderate rate
of monetary expansion, real output would be growing
at about half the increase in full employment poten-
tial, Consequently, the unemployment rate would
most likely increase to above 5 per cent by late 1972.
Finally, I would like to consider the possibility of
achieving a sharp and immediate reduction in market
interest rates. Such an objective has been suggested,
just as in 1967 and 1968, in order to help savings
institutions and the housing industry. With respect to
long-term interest rates, because the inflation pre-
mium incorporated in them is so great, the rates
could be affected only slightly by year’s end even with
extremely rapid monetary expansion. Furthermore,
if rapid monetary expansion were used to reduce long-
term rates this year, these rates would remain at
relatively high levels through 1971 and into 1972.
With respect to short-term rates, we may expect some
declines this year if money supply increases only
moderately. More rapid monetary expansion could
bring slightly greater declines, but at the expense of
higher rates in 1971 and 1972.
Pursuit of such an interest rate policy would result
in no headway in controlling inflation this year and
only slight improvement by 1972. As a result of the
continuing high rate of inflation, short-term interest
rates would soon return to their present levels, or
higher, and long-tern’m rates would rise further from
their present levels. The year 1972 would still be one
of high interest rates. But that is not the whole pic-
ture; the shift back to a moderate rate of money
growth after this year would result in very slow in-
creases in output in 1972 accompanied by a rising
unemployment rate.
The preceding analysis suggests several implica-
tions. First, given the existing momentum of inflation,
relatively stable prices cannot be achieved in a short
period of time, unless we are prepared to accept
very high costs in terms of reduced output and em-
ployment. Second, monetary actions in 1970 to achieve
the short-run employment and interest rate objectives
mentioned are self-defeating over the longer run.
Third, delaying moderate monetary expansion until
after the end of this year, in order to achieve these
unemployment and interest rate objectives, would
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seriously impede efforts to curb inflation within the
next three years. Finally, if we are to contain infla-
tion, there will be accompanying output and employ-
ment costs. Such costs can be postponed this year
by high growth rates in money, but they cannot be
avoided if we are ever to achieve relative price
stability.
In conclusion, it is my opinion that the current
resumption of monetary expansion be kept moderate
and maintained for at least the next three years. Such
a course, in my view, is optimal — it would produce
relative price stability by 1972 without incurring as
high a cost in terms of output and employment as
would a more restrictive course of action. Although
unemployment would rise, this problem in the long
run cannot be treated by monetary and fiscal policy
and should be treated by other means. For example,
better approaches to ameliorate unemployment would
be to remove the many impediments to the free func-
tioning of our labor markets, to improve the mobility
of our labor force, and to upgrade the skills of the
disadvantaged.
As at the beginning of 1967, the stage is now set
for achieving relatively stable prices. Let us firmly
resolve to seize the opportunity. Let us further resolve
that our patience will be equal to the time required.
Above all, let us not throw away this opportunity for
achieving price stability, as we did a few years ago.
If we do, not only will our efforts to date go for
nothing, but the battle against inflation will be more
difficult and more costly the next time we attempt
to make a stand. So this time, let’s not retreat in the
fight against inflation.
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